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proportionality review in a state where you have some places that will charge the death
penalty perhaps too often, and you have other places that would never charge the death
penalty even for the most heinous crime. I'm not an advocate for a statewide
prosecutor who.makes the decisions on the death penalty across the board. I believe
such decisions are better left in the hands of local prosecutors. But it is something that
seems to me to be left out of, and not discussed in the Report.
Finally, what is inappropriate in the context of an "appropriateness" review? In
Indiana we have appropriateness review for every sentence. It's a recent addition to our
case law (and one which has left my office wondering)-we don't even know in the
Court of Appeals of Indiana who the judges in any given case will be; there are blind
panels. You don't know until you either have oral argument or a decision.
Also, what attorneys really end up doing if they're trying their sentencing cases to
an appellate court, who is going to be reading something in black and white on a piece
of paper, they don't see the evidence or the witnesses. They don't really know what
they're judging. Sometimes, for gross inaccuracies, appropriateness review can be
accurate. But it seems to me that for the majority of cases it's going to be very difficult
to determine what is appropriate and what isn't. And this compounds the comparative
proportionality review process, and makes that even more inaccurate. I think these are
things that any state or any legislature who would be considering such a thing should
think about.
CHANGING THE ROLE OF APPELLATE JUDGES IN CAPITAL CASES
Sam Kamin
Instead of talking about the ways in which the judicial review recommended by this
Report fits so nicely into what Massachusetts already allows judges to do, I want to
talk about how different recommendation number nine is from the normal sorts of
things we ask appellate judges to do in death penalty cases.
Normally the principal thing we ask judges to do in death penalty cases is to correct
legal errors. If the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial stage,
if the trial judge inappropriately instructed the jury as to the relevant law, if the
prosecutor engaged in the kinds of comments that Professor Schomhorst talked about,
those are the things we expect appellate courts to ferret out. In short, we ask appellate
judges to make sure that the proper procedures were followed. At a fundamental level
this one of the most important things we ask of appellate courts to do: to correct
procedural errors.
We also ask appellate judges, in at least some circumstances, to correct substantive
errors. For example, we ask them to intervene if the evidence did not demonstrate that
the defendant was guilty of the crime charged, if they find that no reasonablejury could
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, or ifthe jury convicted the wrong
person-and Professor Zimring mentioned this yesterday when he spoke ofHerrera v.
Collins [506 U.S. 390 (1993)]-there are at least some circumstances under which we
expect appellate courts to intervene and prevent the execution of an innocent person,
even if his trial was impeccable.
There are other ways in which we ask appellate courts to determine that a defendant
is not eligible for the death penalty. For example, the trial judge could have
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misinformed the jury about an insanity defense. Thus, it may be that a particular
defendant, while he did the crime, cannot be held criminally liable for it. That is
something we ask appellate judges to intervene and fix as well. We also ask judges to
intervene if the defendant is not eligible for death because the aggravator that was
alleged in a particular case was not sufficiently demonstrated by the evidence, or if the
aggravator that was alleged in a defendant's case is constitutionally defective in one
way or another so that this is not a defendant on whom the death penalty can legally be
imposed.
And this statute asks judges to do all of those things. But it also asks judges to think
in a very different way about whether the death penalty is appropriate in a particular
case. In particular, it asks: Is this sentence appropriate to the defendant's culpability?
And Professor Hoffmann showed us today that he really meant for this to be done
solely with regard to a particular defendant. The task is not to examine a defendant in
the context of other capital offenders, but to ask whether this is the appropriate
punishment for this defendant.
What kind of review is this? Yesterday Professor Sundby referred to it as moral
accuracy review. And I warned him that if he left early I was going to steal his idea and
talk about it today. I don't see him in the room so I'm going to use it. Moral accuracy
review; not: Is this the right person? Not: Were there legal errors? Not: Did the jury
convict the wrong person? But: Is death the right sentence for this person? What kind
of review is that? Well, I have no idea. It asks judges to do a task that we have in the
past given exclusively or almost exclusively to juries; we generally ask only juries to
express the public's will as to the appropriateness of a punishment for a particular
defendant in a capital case.
Professor Hoffmann has told us today that he really meant for this not to be
comparative proportionality review, that the thing he fears is the development of rules
for this sort of review. He told us that he is a believer in what the Supreme Court said
in 1971 in the McGautha [v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)] case, namely that it is
impossible to set forth express rules or criteria for determining who lives and who dies.
The court said in that case that this is a task that is beyond human capacity. And ever
since then the Court has been somewhat backtracking from that; deciding the next year
in Furman [v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)], that rules to guide discretion are
necessary and deciding four years later that Georgia's rewritten capital statute
adequately governed that discretion.
Since at least 1972, the Court has been attempting to balance these two ideas. On
the one hand, the Furman and Gregg [v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)] line of cases
has trumpeted rules and the narrowing of discretion on the one hand. And on the other
hand, the court has used cases like Woodson to mandate discretion, to emphasize the
jury's capacity to consider anything that might spare the defendant's life, and to
establish the right of the defendant to put into evidence any issue that he feels is
mitigating of his guilt.
There has been in the Court's death penalty jurisprudence this enormous tension
between rules and discretion. The discretion that the Supreme Court looked down upon
in Furman, because it created the risk either of discrimination or of arbitrariness, has
found its way back into death penalty law. The Court has said that so long as there are
rules in place, the ultimate decision, the final decision, the decision whether an
individual lives or dies, may be one that is done solely in the jury's discretion. That is,
there must be room in a constitutional death penalty system for a jury to express its will
independent of rules. Once the pool of the death eligible is sufficiently narrowed by
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rule-based decisions, the jury may exercise its best judgments over who will live and
who will die.
So while the Supreme Court has approved discretion, it has approved discretion
only forjuries. It has said that juries play this important role; juries express the public
moral sense. This statute, in a very interesting way, in a way that I think has conflicting
benefits and costs, also allows a judge to express that discretion; or at least to express it
in one direction. That is, if a jury has decided to sentence an individual to death, a
judge or a panel of judges may say that is not an appropriate sentence for this
individual. For one reason or another, a judge or judges, in their wisdom, may decide
that death is not appropriate.
Does this mean that moral accuracy review is a bad idea? Not necessarily. As
someone who is deeply skeptical about the death penalty in the United States, it is
difficult for me to disapprove of opportunities for mercy, of opportunities for a
defendant not to receive the death penalty. And I think the Massachusetts
recommendations provide just such opportunities. For me a good death penalty statute
is one where the death penalty is difficult to impose and easy not to impose. That is, in
a good death penalty regime, there are many hurdles that must be cleared, and at any
point any one actor can say that death is not appropriate for this individual. This
provision strikes me, therefore, as an important development and one more opportunity
for mercy.
On the other hand, I read Furman. And I share with the three concurring justices in
that case a view that there are deep problems with discretion. Discretion may not
always be imposed fairly. Discretion permits personal biases to creep in. So, whether
your concern is with arbitrariness, randomness, or discrimination, allowing ajudge or
judges to exercise discretion, perhaps without opinion, without expressing reasons, is
deeply troubling. Yet, I share Professor Hoffmann's concerns that rules cannot be
enough here; that we don't want moral accuracy review to become a checklist. For
example, the United States Supreme Court, in the State Farm [Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)], decision last term, held that when punitive damages
exceed actual damages by a ratio of more than 10:1, that is presumptively
inappropriate and unconstitutional. And I'm sure that the judges that had decided all
those cases along the way to the result in State Farm must have looked at one another
and said: "Really? That's what we were doing in each of those cases? We were
creating a 10:1 ratio?"
So I share the concern that rules will appear miraculously and spontaneously from
the process of doing moral accuracy review, and that what is meant to be open-ended
review for fairness will become just another rule-bound procedure.
OPEN DISCUSSION
MEADE I'm not sure if there was an understanding that 33E review is
confined to sentencing issues. It's not. It's trial issues as well.
Now, I have some good news for Mr. Creason, and some bad
news for you, Professor Schornhorst. The First Circuit has held
that the Supreme Judicial Court's decision to review an
unpreserved claim, to determine whether a miscarriage ofjustice
has occurred, does not waive the procedural default issue-and I
agree with what you were talking about, Mr. Creason.
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